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Taking the Offensive, October 1966-September 1967 (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War)

Unknown Author
4.9/5 (9207 ratings)
Description:In early 1966, the head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William C. Westmoreland, controlled some 185,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Over the last eighteen months he and his South Vietnamese allies had checked the growth of the Communist insurgency and were now poised to begin making progress across a wide front—political, economic, psychological, and military. With a robust logistical network in place and another 200,000 U.S. troops expected to arrive by the end of 1967, Westmoreland told his superiors that the allied strategy for the coming year “will be one of a general offensive.” Although the primary mission of the U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand would be “destroying VC/NVA [Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army] main forces and base areas,” they would also support the South Vietnamese pacification program designed to eradicate Viet Cong influence at the village and hamlet level. “The 1967 combined campaign plan,” Westmoreland reported, “is based on the concept that the war in Vietnam is a single war” requiring the U.S. and South Vietnamese to apply a wide range of military, economic, and political measures suited to the particular conditions of each region and locality.Political considerations at home prevented Westmoreland from intensifying the war beyond a certain point. The growing cost of the war—some 5,700 U.S. troops had already died, and another 26,800 had been wounded—steadily eroded public support. The president’s refusal to mobilize the nation’s reserve components meant that MACV’s maximum strength would likely top out at around 500,000 men. Johnson would not allow Westmoreland to strike the enemy’s sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia with conventional ground forces, fearing such attacks would destabilize the pro-Western governments in both countries. The MACV commander did monitor the Communist supply network in Laos and Cambodia using small reconnaisThe 173d Airborne Brigade advance on a wood line in War Zone D. National Archives 11 sance teams from the MACV Studies and Observation Group (MACV–SOG), but the existence of that program was kept a tightly held secret. Likewise, the president ruled out any conventional ground attack into North Vietnam out of concern that the Soviet Union and China would formally enter the war on Hanoi’s behalf. Despite the restrictions he faced and the obstacles he had to overcome, Westmoreland hoped his 1966–1967 campaign would begin to swing the momentum of the war in the favor of the allies.We have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with Taking the Offensive, October 1966-September 1967 (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War). To get started finding Taking the Offensive, October 1966-September 1967 (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War), you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
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Taking the Offensive, October 1966-September 1967 (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War)

Unknown Author
4.4/5 (1290744 ratings)
Description: In early 1966, the head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William C. Westmoreland, controlled some 185,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Over the last eighteen months he and his South Vietnamese allies had checked the growth of the Communist insurgency and were now poised to begin making progress across a wide front—political, economic, psychological, and military. With a robust logistical network in place and another 200,000 U.S. troops expected to arrive by the end of 1967, Westmoreland told his superiors that the allied strategy for the coming year “will be one of a general offensive.” Although the primary mission of the U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand would be “destroying VC/NVA [Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army] main forces and base areas,” they would also support the South Vietnamese pacification program designed to eradicate Viet Cong influence at the village and hamlet level. “The 1967 combined campaign plan,” Westmoreland reported, “is based on the concept that the war in Vietnam is a single war” requiring the U.S. and South Vietnamese to apply a wide range of military, economic, and political measures suited to the particular conditions of each region and locality.Political considerations at home prevented Westmoreland from intensifying the war beyond a certain point. The growing cost of the war—some 5,700 U.S. troops had already died, and another 26,800 had been wounded—steadily eroded public support. The president’s refusal to mobilize the nation’s reserve components meant that MACV’s maximum strength would likely top out at around 500,000 men. Johnson would not allow Westmoreland to strike the enemy’s sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia with conventional ground forces, fearing such attacks would destabilize the pro-Western governments in both countries. The MACV commander did monitor the Communist supply network in Laos and Cambodia using small reconnaisThe 173d Airborne Brigade advance on a wood line in War Zone D. National Archives 11 sance teams from the MACV Studies and Observation Group (MACV–SOG), but the existence of that program was kept a tightly held secret. Likewise, the president ruled out any conventional ground attack into North Vietnam out of concern that the Soviet Union and China would formally enter the war on Hanoi’s behalf. Despite the restrictions he faced and the obstacles he had to overcome, Westmoreland hoped his 1966–1967 campaign would begin to swing the momentum of the war in the favor of the allies.We have made it easy for you to find a PDF Ebooks without any digging. And by having access to our ebooks online or by storing it on your computer, you have convenient answers with Taking the Offensive, October 1966-September 1967 (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War). To get started finding Taking the Offensive, October 1966-September 1967 (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War), you are right to find our website which has a comprehensive collection of manuals listed.
Our library is the biggest of these that have literally hundreds of thousands of different products represented.
Pages
Format
PDF, EPUB & Kindle Edition
Publisher
Release
ISBN
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